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Abstract 
This study gives an overview of retirement modelling, starting from the single-period 
consumption/leisure model up to the recent life-cycle multiple-decisions and joint retirement 
models, paying particular attention to the role played by the option value model in the economic 
literature on retirement. 
The option value model was initially interpreted as a sub-optimal solution of the dynamic 
programming rule. But its simpler implementation and similar theoretical background soon 
attracted economists’ attention to the trade-off between computational complexity and 
predictive validity in retirement modelling. Supporters of the option value model underlined 
how “complex specifications may presume computational facility that is beyond the grasp of 
most real people ...” (Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise, 1992). Moreover, they provided evidence 
that the option value model was at least as good as the dynamic programming in terms of 
predictive validity.  
A comparison between option value and more recent models, which explain much more than the 
first dynamic programming applications, depends on the specific context of the analysis. Even 
if, in many cases, it is likely that more complex models better approximate reality, there can be 
situations in which rules governing actual behaviour are simpler and more suitably modelled 
within the option value framework. At the same time, the option value itself can to some extent 
be modified and adapted to given circumstances. 
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Empirical analysis often raises questions of approximations to underlying 
individual behavior. Closer approximation may require more complex statistical 
specifications. On the other hand, more complex specifications may presume 
computational facility that is beyond the grasp of most real people and therefore 
less consistent with the actual rules that govern their behavior, even though 
economic theory may push analysts to increasingly more complex specifications. 
Thus the issue is not only whether more complex models are worth the effort, but 
also whether they are better. 
 Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise (1992) 
 
1. Introduction 
When the option value model was introduced in the late 80s, retirement literature was going 
through a crucial period. The first static models were already outdated, and the stochastic 
dynamic programming rule had already been introduced. The empirical implementation of 
dynamic programming models was however clashing with their computational complexity and 
with software and hardware limitations. Strong simplifying assumptions had to be imposed on 
the models’ structure to facilitate estimation, and potential capabilities could not be exploited in 
practice. 
The option value model was initially interpreted as a sub-optimal solution of the dynamic 
programming rule. Its simpler implementation and similar theoretical background however soon 
attracted economists’ attention to the trade-off between computational complexity and 
predictive validity in retirement modelling. If there was almost complete agreement on the fact 
that reduced form models were much simpler but also had a much worse predictive validity than 
structural models, the comparison between option value and dynamic programming rules was 
debated far more. Supporters of the option value model underlined how “(...) complex 
specifications may presume computational facility that is beyond the grasp of most real people 
and therefore less consistent with the actual rules that govern their behaviour (...)”(Lumsdaine, 
Stock, and Wise 1992). Moreover, they provided evidence that the option value model was at 
least as good as the dynamic programming in terms of predictive validity. They therefore 
claimed that the trade-off did not exist, because the option value model was both more tractable 
and better than dynamic programming in approximating actual retirement behaviour. 
More recently, economic theory pushed research towards much more complex specifications. 
Health, family characteristics, wealth, wages, social security and pension dynamics are captured 
in almost omni-comprehensive and highly stochastic frameworks. Their empirical 
implementation is helped and speeded-up by the availability of powerful computers and 
prepared routine packages. At the same time, the option value model has been modified and 2 | MICHELE BELLONI 
improved with respect to its original version. Its role should therefore be revised in light of these 
important changes. 
In this study we provide an overview of retirement modelling, starting from the single-period 
consumption/leisure model up to the recent life-cycle multiple-decisions and joint retirement 
models (section 2). We devote particular attention to the role played by the option value model 
in the economic literature on retirement. In particular, while in section 3.1 we describe its 
characteristics, in section 3.2 we compare it with other models, focusing on the relation with 
dynamic programming in terms of computational complexity and predictive validity. In section 
3.3 we describe its developments with respect to the original Stock and Wise version, and we 
give an overview of the reduced form applications derived from its structural version. Section 4 
draws some conclusions. 
2.  The evolution of retirement modelling  
Induced by the long run decreasing trend in the participation rates of older workers, the analysis 
of the economic determinants of retirement started in the 70s in the US. Since then, its progress 
has continued without interruption. It is possible to distinguish three main evolutionary phases. 
The first, which lasts 20 years until the end of the 80s, is characterised by important theoretical 
improvements. It starts with the static one-period consumption/leisure framework, in which 
retirement was no more than the special case of labour supply equal to zero, and it ends with the 
first dynamic life-cycle models. The second phase, carried out mostly in the 90s, is 
characterised by empirical improvements. It introduces and develops the stochastic dynamic 
programming rule, and the option value model. Uncertainty about future outcomes such as 
wealth, income and health status is part of the most developed applications in this phase. In the 
third phase some important assumptions are relaxed, such as the assumption of imperfect credit 
markets, which allows for some models to optimise jointly with respect to consumption and 
retirement age. Retirement starts to be seen as a choice taken in the family context. 
2.1  From standard labour supply to life-cycle models  
At the beginning of the 70s, retirement was modelled as a standard labour supply choice. The 
one-period consumption/leisure framework imposes strong restrictions on the lifetime utility 
function  ) , ,.., , ,.., , ( 1 1 T T t t C L C L C L U U = , where  t L  and  t C  are leisure and consumption at 
time t, and T  is the maximum age. 
Assuming separability, such that  ) , ( .. ) , ( .. ) , ( 1 1 1 T T T t t t L C U L C U L C U U + + + + = , and 
imposing no borrowing and no saving, each year is treated separately from the others. Full 
‘retirement’ occurs in this theoretical framework when leisure equals the total available time 
(i.e. labour supply is equal to zero). The relation between  t U  and  1 − t U  is not specified and 
leisure is not bunched. What distinguishes the decisional environment of older workers from the 
others is the budget constraint, which is kinked if pensions are earnings-tested. The ‘cost’ of 
leisure can thus be lower (or even zero) above a given threshold of income if wages and 
pensions can be only partially (or not at all) cumulated. The existence of a pension system 
therefore, according to this model, increases leisure through both an income and a substitution 
effect.
1 
                                                      
1 First applicants of this kind of modelling are, for example, Feldstein (1974), Boskin (1977) and 
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Model simplifications are often at odds with the peculiarity of the retirement choice. For 
example, leisure is modelled in the same way both before and after retirement, generating 
inconsistent results. Suppose that an earnings-test is applied only to workers up to a given age. 
Through a relaxation of the budget constraint, the model would predict an increase in the labour 
supply above that age, which is clearly in contrast with empirical evidence. Moreover, suppose 
that a fully-funded pension system, generating a mere intertemporal shifting of wealth, was 
introduced. It would perhaps not induce any income effect, and retirement would be 
overestimated by the model. 
Starting from Feldstein (1974), the intrinsic life-cycle nature of retirement – and how both 
present and future income opportunities affect it – is already a clear concept. In Burkhauser 
(1979) early retirement depends on the ratio between the current pension and the pension at 
normal retirement age. Along this line, Reimers (1977) includes every ratio between the current 
and future retirement ages as determinants of retirement. A slightly different approach is taken 
by Bulow (1981), who borrows the concept of ‘true wage’ from the literature on human capital 
accumulation. The true wage, given by the wage plus the pension accrual, is considered better 
than the market wage for retirement studies because it takes into account the value of fringe 
benefits. Its extension from pension accrual to social security accrual, broadly applied nowadays 
in the literature of “money’s worth measures”, is proposed by Burkhauser (1980). 
Empirical applications in the first phase are mostly based on OLS estimation of reduced form 
models. Fewer studies apply the newly developed hazard model and ‘lifetime budget constraint’ 
approach. The proportional hazard model, borrowed from the studies on the duration of 
unemployment spells, is proposed in Hausman and Wise (1985). It is characterised by two 
important innovations. First, dynamic aspects can enter into the analysis without difficulty (and 
there are many factors affecting the choice that change over time). Second, it can handle 
censored data, and thus it can exploit in a more efficient way the information included in the 
long panel datasets. The “lifetime budget constraint” approach (Burtless 1986) is one of the first 
empirically feasible long-horizon retirement models. In its formulation, the standard 
consumption/leisure budget constraint is adapted to retirement choices: hours of work are 
replaced by years and annual wages by cumulative compensation.
2 
Its author underlines how it is more forward-looking than the hazard model, but also admits the 
importance of dynamic capabilities. The option value model and the dynamic programming, in 
the second evolutionary phase, will for the first time bring these two features – incorporating 
forward-looking behaviour and dynamic capabilities – together. 
A lifetime retirement problem was already solved in Boskin (1977) and Reimers (1977). Its 
general version, in the case of continuous time, can be written as: 
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2 Burtless and Hausman (1978) and Hausman and Wise (1980) previously applied this model to other 
fields of economics. 4 | MICHELE BELLONI 
where  Ω is the maximum age of the individual, β  is the discount factor, Y  is the labour 
income,  ) (R B  is the pension (or/and social security) benefit if retirement occurs at the date R , 
and r  is the market interest rate (borrowing and lending is allowed). Retirement is the date R  
such that 1 = t L ,  R t ≥ ∀ . 
Mitchell and Fields (1984) and Gustman and Steinmeier (1986) provide two of the first and 
most relevant empirical implementations of this general framework, modelling in detail the 
lifetime income pattern. The former highlights how both earnings and pension benefits depend 
on the retirement date, and takes an indirect utility function approach. The latter separately 
models full and partial retirement. Individuals face a highly kinked budget constraint because 
part-time wage can be lower than a full-time one and because social security benefits are 
earnings-tested. Gustman and Steinmeier’s is the first model that is able to explain the spikes of 
exits at ages 62 and 65 in the US, and it is the most advanced and empirically feasible model of 
this period. 
At the end of the first phase therefore, life-cycle and dynamic approaches had already been 
introduced and the basis for a structural analysis of retirement already posed. Empirical 
applications still consisted mainly of reduced form models or of other simplified models, 
however. The next question economists posed was how to introduce uncertainty on future 
outcomes into the analysis. Dynamic programming was the method that allowed for relevant 
improvements in this direction. 
2.2 Stochastic  dynamic  programming 
The stochastic dynamic programming model (DP) is based on the recursive representation of the 
value function. At time t, the individual can either decide to retire and derive utility from 
present and future pension (and/or social security) benefits, or to continue to work and derive 
utility from the current wage plus keeping the option to re-evaluate the problem the next time. 
The value function at time t is given by: 
 
∑
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etc. 
 
(.) w U  and  (.) R U are the utility functions for a worker and for a retiree respectively, and υ  and 
ω  are the correspondent error terms. From this general framework, both the utility functional 
forms and the structure of the error terms have to be specified in order to define the retirement 
model. A dynamic programming model therefore does not exist, but there are several distinct THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY AND PREDICTIVE VALIDITY | 5 
models characterised by their ad hoc assumptions. For example, assuming that  t υ  and  t ω  are 
i.i.d. (so that  0 ] [ = +s t t E υ  and 0 , 0 ] [ = ∀ = + s E s t t ω ), and taking into account of the probability 
to be alive in s conditional on being alive in t (2) becomes: 
 
] , max[
2 1
t t t t t V V V ω υ + + =                                  (4) 
with:  
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from which  ) Pr( ) Pr(
2 1
t t t t V V t R ω υ + < + = = . The solution is obtained by recursive 
optimisation, imposing the final condition 
2 1
max max t t V V =  (where  max t  is the mandatory retirement 
age).
3 
It requires computing multiple integrals, whose dimension depends on both the number of 
periods between t and  max t  and on the error structure. 
In order to find a tractable version of (2), the first applications imposed particularly strong 
assumptions on the error structure. This is the case of Rust (1989) – based on Rust (1987) – who 
assumes i.i.d. errors drawn from a normal distribution.
4 Daula and Moffitt (1989), who build a 
DP model for retention in the US military, make the same simplifying assumptions. 
Gradually relaxing the i.i.d. hypothesis, dynamic programming evolved toward more complex 
error structures. Stock and Wise (1990) assume a Markov process for the error terms, at the cost 
of ‘approximating’ dynamic programming with the option value model. Lumsdaine, Stock and 
Wise (1992) in order to compare the predictive validity of DP and option value, modify the 
models of Daula and Moffitt (1989) and Berkovec and Stern (1991) introducing individual 
unobserved heterogeneity.
5 Daula and Moffitt (1995) propose a model with a similar error 
structure of the Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise’s version of Daula and Moffitt (1989).
6 They 
                                                      
3 See R. Bellman (1957). 
4 In Rust’s model, the individual maximises his utility with respect to both his working state (choosing 
between part-time, full-time and retirement) and his level of consumption jointly. Although the extension 
to multiple choices is an important innovation of the model, in its empirical application consumption is 
approximated by income. Nevertheless, the Rust’s model represented the reference retirement model for a 
long time. 
5 In the modified version of Daula and Moffitt’s model, individual effects enter additively into the utility 
functions. In the revised version of the Berkovec and Stern’s model – which assumes an extreme value 
distribution and has a closer form solution for the retirement probability – they instead enter 
multiplicatively.  
6 They quantify the effects of US military compensation of retirement rates, and show that the choice 
between a military and civilian career is a simple linear function of current and future difference between 
civilian and military wages. 6 | MICHELE BELLONI 
compare the feasibility of their model with the complexity in Gotz and McCall (1984), who 
analyse a similar problem but impose restrictions to many parameters and do not compute most 
of the standard errors. 
Berkovec and Stern (1991) innovate in applying the method of simulated moments to ensure 
empirical tractability to their model. In this method, the distribution of the error terms is 
simulated drawing from an assumed distribution. They include an additive individual and job 
specific random effect.
7 
Finally, Rust and Phelan (1997) represents the borderline of the second phase. The model they 
propose is advanced in several directions, especially in the treatment of uncertainty. Future 
health status, expenditure, employment, income and even marital status are stochastic. 
Empirical tractability is guaranteed by restricting the unobserved state variables to follow an 
i.i.d. extreme value distribution, so that all the correlations are incorporated into the 
observables.
8 Saving and borrowing are allowed, but in practice it is assumed that – due to data 
limitations and relying on the empirical evidence in the US – consumption is equal to income in 
every period. 
At the end of the second phase, individual heterogeneity is commonly implemented in the error 
structure of DP models. The most advanced incorporate uncertainty about future outcomes such 
as health, income and wealth. Saving and borrowing are allowed, but empirical applications still 
either rely on simplifying assumptions like imperfect credit markets, or assume they are equal to 
zero (relying on empirical experience or data limitations). The goals are now to model multiple 
decisions and to allow for consumption smoothing, relaxing the assumptions on the credit 
markets, and to incorporate complex error structures in multidimensional stochastic 
frameworks. 
2.3 Multiple-decisions  and  joint retirement models 
Models belonging to the previous evolutionary phases incorporate extreme assumptions on 
credit markets characteristics. For example, Stock and Wise (1990) and Rust and Phelan (1997) 
assume imperfect credit markets, and do not allow for consumption smoothing. Under this 
assumption, in each period the level of consumption and the income earned coincide, and the 
decision of whether to retire defines the optimal level of consumption. In dynamic programming 
models, given that past choices do not affect future ones, it simplifies the labour supply problem 
to repetitive one-period optimisations. On the other hand, the lifetime budget constraint model 
of Burtless (1986) assumes perfect markets and complete consumption smoothing. 
More recent models relax these assumptions and take intermediate and more realistic 
perspectives. New statistical tools, in particular the method of simulated moments, allow 
dynamic programming to identify the model parameters, also in these circumstances. French 
(2005) presents a model of labour supply, saving and retirement behaviour in which future 
health status and wages are uncertain. Individuals can save to insure themselves against health 
and wage shocks (and for their old age) but cannot borrow from social security, pensions and 
future wages, in response to an adverse shock. As a consequence, individuals are forced to 
continue to work until they are eligible for social security and pension benefits, but they may 
                                                      
7 As in Rust (1989), their study looks at the transitions between full-time work, part time and retirement. 
The focus is however on the demographic determinant of the choice, like education, race and health 
status, while the role of social security and pension in the choice is not considered.  
8 Rust and Phelan (1997) study the effect on labour supply of US Social Security and Medicate in the 
presence of incomplete markets for loans, annuities and health insurance. Coherently, they restrict the 
analysis on poorer workers with restricted access to these markets and without pension coverage. THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY AND PREDICTIVE VALIDITY | 7 
leave afterwards, start dissaving and, for example, smooth-out an increase in the early 
retirement age. Van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2005) find similar results, but under different 
assumptions on credit markets. In their model borrowing is allowed as well as saving, but 
poorer individuals are forced to work until early retirement age because they have lower wages 
and (optimally) little accumulated wealth.
9 
Health insurance market assumptions have the same relevance of the assumptions on credit 
markets. A hotly debated issue has always been the effect of Medicare and, to a lesser extent, of 
the employer-provided health insurance on retirement choices.
10 Gustman and Steinmeier 
(1994) assume no uncertainty on future health status. Given that the worker evaluates health 
insurance at the cost paid by his employer and that there is no risk of unexpected expenses, they 
find a limited effect of health insurance on retirement. Rust and Phelan (1997) assume 
uncertainty and imperfect markets. Given that the worker takes into account the risk of future 
health shocks and cannot insure against them, they find a very strong effect. The recent work of 
French and Jones (2004) highlights the importance of both realistic assumptions on market 
imperfections and of incorporating uncertainty into the models. In their model, in fact, workers 
take into account volatility in health expenditures but can also self-insure against future shocks. 
They find intermediate results, and reconcile previous opposite evidence. 
A number of interesting questions were raised in the late 90s in the US as a result of the 
growing proportion of married women approaching old age with considerable working histories. 
A first, to which empirical studies gave qualitatively an almost uniform answer, was how 
frequent the phenomenon of ‘joint retirement’ is, i.e. spouses retiring approximately at the same 
time regardless of their individual ages. If in the classical ‘male-breadwinning model’, 
retirement is seen as an individual choice, especially taken by males, retirement in the family 
context requires adapting both the budget constraint and the preferences to the household’s 
environment. Work choices of a member of the family can in fact affect both the financial 
reward of work and non-work of the other and his/her relative preference for leisure and work. 
A pioneering group of studies, dating back to the first half of the 90’s or even earlier, 
documented correlations between spouses in labour force status (see Clark, Jonson and 
MdDermed 1980, Hurd 1990 and McCarty 1990). A different issue, which is first tackled in 
Blau 1998, is how the labour force status of one member of the family affects the labour force 
transition of the others. Blau’s model answers this question by maximising a household utility 
function in a complex framework, characterised by a correlation between the unobserved 
component of the utility functions and by lagged endogenous variables that allow past status to 
                                                      
9 Economists have always looked for a way to solve the age-62 and age-65 ‘puzzles’, i.e. spikes of exits 
that occur in correspondence to these two ages in the US. Many of them, starting from Gustman and 
Steinmeier (1986), find a plausible solution in the credit and health insurance market imperfections. 
French (2005) represents one of the most notable recent examples of this kind. Other studies, like 
Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) believe that retirement peaks can be attributed to social security rules and 
to a wide heterogeneity in time preferences. Individuals with high discount rates have few assets and give 
a high value to the reduction in benefits after age 62. Therefore, ignoring the later increase in benefits, 
they retire at age 62. Those with low discount rates have more assets and give a high value to the 
declining actuarial adjustment after age 65. Therefore they are induced to retire at age 65. 
10 Medicare covers the health expenses of the whole American population starting from age 65, 
independently of working status. Most of the younger workers are covered by an employer-provided 
insurance that is tied to their job. There exists therefore a potential incentive to continue to work until 65. 8 | MICHELE BELLONI 
affect current decisions.
11 The results show strong associations between the retirement choices 
of the couple, motivated largely by a preference for shared leisure. 
These results are also found in Gustman and Steinmeier (2000), which confirms that joint 
retirement is due to preferences and not to the budget sets. Moreover, preferences for joint 
leisure can be asymmetric. Gustman and Steinmeier (2004) provide strong evidence – and 
confirm the finding of the companion paper Gustman and Steinmeier (2000) – that the 
husband’s decision is actually more strongly influenced by the wife’s than vice versa. 
Coile (2004) focuses instead on the adaptation of the budget constraint to the family’s 
framework. Husbands and wives’ retirement behaviour, according to him, is affected by 
‘spillover effects’ which come from the spouse’s financial incentives as provided by pensions 
and social security. He estimates a reduced form model where the retirement probability 
depends, among other variables, on the labour force status of the spouse and on the head of 
household and spouse’s financial incentives. Both Blau (1998) and Coile (2004) highlight how 
not accounting for either spillover effects or shared preferences can lead to a mismeasurement 
of the effects of policy reforms. For example, a policy intervention that increases the age of 
retirement by acting on financial incentives, in the case of shared leisure brings about an 
additional effect that occurs through the spouse’s behavioural change. 
3.  The option value model in the retirement literature 
The immediate motivation for the study of Stock and Wise (1990) is the evidence of a little 
attention dedicated to the effects of pension plans on the retirement of American workers. 
Economists had instead focused on social security provision which, with few exceptions, was 
shown to have a very small impact on their choices (see e.g. Burtless and Moffitt 1984, Burtless 
1986 and Gustman and Steinmeier 1986). A priori, pension funds could have a stronger effect 
than social security because their design – characterised by a complicated system of incentives 
and disincentives – was thought to ‘drive’ the worker’s choice to specific retirement ages. 
To this aim, Stock and Wise propose a structural model of retirement and estimate it on a 
pension plan firm dataset. In this section we first provide an introductory description of the 
model and then we compare it with previously existing models and with the dynamic 
programming rule. Afterwards we describe its developments and give an overview of the 
reduced form applications derived from the structural version of the model. 
3.1  A description of the model 
In the option value model, a worker evaluates the following value function:  
 
∑∑
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− − + =
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)) ( ( ) ( ) (
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s R
t s
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t s
t r B U Y U r V β β                 (6) 
 
where  (.) w U  represents his utility while he is working, which is a function of the wage  s Y he 
earns at age s up to the retirement age r, and  (.) R U  represents his utility while he is retired, 
                                                      
11 Blau’s model has been recently extended in Mastrogiacomo, Alessie and Lindeboom (2004) to the 
analysis of differences in retirement behaviour between married couples and singles. THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY AND PREDICTIVE VALIDITY | 9 
function of the pension  ) (r Bs  he receives at age s (where  r s ≥ ) if he retires in r.  β  is the 
subjective time-preference discount factor, and Ω  the maximum age he can survive. Therefore, 
his value function depends on the retirement age r. Retirement is seen as an absorbing state, i.e. 
a condition from which return to work is not allowed. 
In a sort of a two-stage comparison, the worker determines first what is the future retirement 
year that gives him the maximum expected utility, and then he compares that utility ( *) (r V E t t ) 
with the expected utility of retiring immediately ( ) (t V E t t ). If we define the difference between 
the two as the expected gain from postponing retirement,  ) ( *) ( *) ( t V E r V E r G t t t t t − =  , then 
the worker retires if  0 *) ( < r Gt , while he continues to work otherwise. 
The instantaneous utilities have the following constant relative risk aversion form: 
 
s s s w Y Y U υ
γ + = ) (                                   (7a) 
s s s R r kB B U ω
γ + = )) ( ( ) (                             (7b) 
 
where k represents the value of income in the status of worker relative to its value in the status 
of retired, and γ  is the degree of risk aversion with respect to income uncertainty.  s υ  and  s ω  
are time-and-individual specific random effects, assumed to be independent over income and 
age. They capture unobserved determinants of retirement, such as private wealth and health 
conditions. Given that they are usually persistent over time for the same individual, random 
effects are assumed to follow a Markovian process as: 
 
s s s υ ε ρυ υ + = −1          0 ) ( 1 = − s s E υ ε                        (8a) 
s s s ω ε ρω ω + = −1         0 ) ( 1 = − s s E ω ε                        (8b) 
0 ) , cov( = s s ω υ           Ω + = ... 1 t s                           (8c) 
 
Two versions of the option value model are estimated. The first is called single year probability 
version, and is estimated on a cross-section. The second is the multiple years probability 
version, and requires a longitudinal dataset together with additional assumptions on the error 
structure. The utility functions parameters  ρ β γ , , , k  and the variance of the residuals 
2
υ σ  are 
obtained by maximum likelihood estimation.  
3.2  A comparison with other models 
3.2.1 Option value and previous models 
According to Stock and Wise, the option value model has been an important improvement in the 
retirement literature because it unified the advantages of the two most prevalent modelling 
techniques for that time, i.e. the hazard model and the lifetime budget constraint approach. Like 
the latter (and contrary to the former) the option value model is in fact suitable to capturing a 
forward-looking behaviour of an individual who compares the value of retiring today with the 10 | MICHELE BELLONI 
value of doing it some years ahead. We provide the following example to illustrate this point. 
Suppose that a worker has to decide whether to retire at age t. Suppose the pension system 
penalises him if he retires in t +1,… ,t + k – 1, while it gives him a significant premium if he 
retires at age t + k. If he is short-sighted and he compares only the values of retiring in t with the 
value of retiring in t +1, then it is optimal for him to retire in t. If he is more forward-looking 
and he compares the utility of retiring in t with the utility of retiring in t + k, then it is optimal 
for him to retire in t + k. The option value model predicts the correct choice. A retirement 
model that assumes a more short-sighted behaviour, such as a model based on the accrual (Coile 
and Gruber 2000), would instead fail. Note how this feature leads to a fit improvement only if 
financial incentives are non-linear and provide bonus and penalisations at certain ages or 
seniorities, as in the example above (back-loaded private pensions). In several instances this is 
not the case and comparing the present with the next alternative is sufficient to capture an 
optimising forward-looking behaviour. In a limit case – when each individual in the sample 
chooses t +1 as optimal in the first of the two-phases comparison described in the previous 
section – this feature does not increase the fit at all with respect to a two-year comparison 
decision rule. 
Like the hazard model (and contrary to the lifetime budget constraint), the option value model is 
dynamic because the information on which the worker’s expectations are based change over 
time. If the worker does not retire, his information set becomes wider and more precise 
expectations on future wages can be made. It should however be noted how this feature belongs 
to the multiple-year probability version of the model, where the same individual is followed 
over time, but does not belong to the – much more adopted – single year version of it. 
The hazard model has the advantage that several forms of monetary compensation, such as 
present, past and future wages as well as social security and pension wealth, can enter simply 
into the model specification and without increasing its computational complexity. The option 
value, being a structural model, is on the contrary much less flexible and does not easily 
accommodate modifications. Moreover, the hazard model is commonly thought not to have an 
interpretation in terms of utility, but Stock and Wise (1988) show that this is not actually true. 
They show that it is a special case of the multiple-year probability version of the option value 
model, and in theory it can replace it. They also stress however that in practice the restrictions 
that are needed to make an option value and hazard model identical are very strong and an 
actual substitution of the former with the latter is almost never possible.
12 
3.2.2 Option value and dynamic programming: theory 
Dynamic programming and option value share many characteristics, above all the idea that 
workers decide whether to retire according to an evaluation of the opportunity-cost of the choice 
in terms of utility. The absorbing state assumption, crucial for the computational feasibility of 
both of them, is also common. 
However they differ widely in the way uncertainty is treated: the option value rule compares the 
utility of retiring now with the maximum value of expected future utilities, while the dynamic 
programming compares the expected value of the maximum of current versus future retirement 
options. Consider the following example. Define Ω as the worker’s maximum life span. 
Assume, for simplicity, that it is permitted to retire up to the last year of life, i.e. up to age Ω . 
                                                      
12 The proportional hazard model is a special case of the option value model if some restrictions are 
imposed on the random effects and on the deterministic part of the expected gain of postponing 
retirement. In particular, the former must be time-invariant and have a unit exponential distribution while 
the latter must be non-increasing over time. See Stock and Wise (1988) for further details. THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY AND PREDICTIVE VALIDITY | 11 
Assume that β  in (6) and that k and γ  in (7a – 7b) are set to one. Consider first his decision of 
whether retiring at age Ω – 1, i.e. when his time-horizon is one period. According to both 
option value and dynamic programming, he continues to work if 
] ) ( [ ] [ ) 1 ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 Ω Ω − Ω Ω Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω + Ω > + ≡ − Ω > ω υ B E Y E V E V E . The two decision rules 
thus the same result in this case. 
Consider then his decision to retire at age Ω  – 2, when his time-horizon is two periods. 
According to the option value rule, he continues to work if: 
 
    ≡ − Ω > Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω ) 2 ( )] ( ), 1 ( max[ 2 2 2 2 2 2 V E V E V E  
> + + − Ω + + − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω ]] [ ], ) 1 ( [ max[ ) ( 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 υ ω υ Y E B E Y E                            
] ) 2 ( [ ] ) 2 ( [ 1 1 2 2 2 2 − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω + − Ω + + − Ω ω ω B E B E  
 
while, according to the dynamic programming rule, he does it if: 
 
≡ − Ω > Ω − Ω + + − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω ) 2 ( )] ( ), 1 ( max[ ] [ 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 V E V V E Y E υ         
> + + − Ω + + − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω ] , ) 1 ( max[ ] [ 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 υ ω υ Y B E Y E  
                            ] ) 2 ( [ ] ) 2 ( [ 1 1 2 2 2 2 − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω − Ω + − Ω + + − Ω ω ω B E B E  
 
To the extent that the maximum between the expected values of two random variables is lower 
than the expected value of the maximum between them, the option value rule underestimates the 
value of postponing retirement and consequently overestimates retirement probabilities. 
The option value is simpler to estimate than the dynamic programming. Thanks to the absorbing 
state and Markov assumptions, the value function (6) can be divided into a deterministic and a 
stochastic part, which drastically simplifies its computation (see Stock and Wise 1990). The 
dynamic programming, by contrast, does not allow for this simplification, and implies 
computing multiple integrals. 
3.2.3 Option value and dynamic programming: practice  
The same theoretical background of option value and dynamic programming, together with the 
simpler implementation of the option value model, soon attracted the economists’ attention on 
the possible trade-off between computational complexity and predictive validity in retirement 
modelling. The debate was, from one side, focused on the comparison between structural 
models and reduced forms and, from the other – within the category of structural model – 
between option value and dynamic programming. 
The first comparison between option value and other models is provided in Lumsdaine, Stock 
and Wise (1992). Exploiting an exit window in the middle of the period covered by their 
dataset, the authors compare the predictive validity of the option value model with that of two 
different versions of dynamic programming and with a probit model. The models developed in 
Berkovec and Stern (1991) and in Daula and Moffitt (1989) are modified for the comparison 12 | MICHELE BELLONI 
purpose.
13 To the same aim, the probit formulation includes a specification with the expected 
gain from postponing retirement as the sole explanatory variable. 
Other comparisons are provided in Ausink and Wise (1993), in Daula and Moffit (1995) and in 
Burkhauser, Butler and Gumus (2003). In these studies the option value model is applied to 
study permanent transitions from work to a different status, not necessarily retirement (i.e. 
problems of optimal stopping). Ausink and Wise (1993) study the effect of the compensation on 
the departure rates of American military pilots toward both civilian airlines and the military 
pension. They compare the option value model with both the DP model proposed by Daula and 
Moffitt (1989) as modified in Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise (1992) and the ACOL model (see 
note in the next section). Daula and Moffit (1995) propose a similar comparison (although they 
rename the option value applied in the military as the ‘TCOL’ model) in order to study military 
reenlistments. Burkhauser, Butler and Gumus (2003) explain how health conditions and policy 
variables determine Social Security Disability Insurance application timing in the US. 
All of these studies agree on two main findings. The first one, as expected, is that reduced form 
models – and the ACOL model – have a much lower predictive validity than structural models. 
The second, more relevant, is that the option value has a predictive validity in line with the 
dynamic programming models, both in-sample and out-of-sample.
14 These works therefore 
provided evidence that the trade-off between computational complexity and predictive validity 
did not exist, and that the option value model was at the same time more computationally 
feasible and more powerful than dynamic programming in approximating actual retirement. 
3.3  Further developments and reduced forms  
The above mentioned studies, other than comparing the option value model with DP, modify 
and develop the original Stock and Wise’s model. Ausink and Wise (1993) adapt the 
instantaneous utility function for ‘leavers’ (equation 7b) to handle two possible destinations: 
military pension and civilian career. Burkhauser, Butler and Gumus (2003) make changes in the 
empirical specification of the expected gain from postponing retirement. They follow Daula and 
Moffit (1995) and add a vector of observable variables to the utility function for ‘non-
applicants’ (equation 7a). In this way, they incorporate into the model the heterogeneity across 
socio-demographic groups concerning the relative preference towards leisure versus 
consumption. They also extend to ‘applicants’ (leavers) the Taylor approximation that Stock 
and Wise apply only to workers (stayers). They therefore allow for the variance of expected 
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits to be different from zero.
15 An extended 
version of the Stock and Wise’s model is proposed in Hurd, Loughran, and Panis (2003). They 
develop an option value model where the worker can choose between two exit routes – 
                                                      
13 The model in Daula and Moffitt (1989) – modified to incorporate an individual random effect – is 
closer to the option value model than the model in Berkovec and Stern (1991). Both Daula and Moffitt 
(1989) and Stock and Wise (1990) assume in fact a normal distribution of the residuals and non-zero 
covariances, although the similarity in the covariance structure comes from very different assumptions. 
14 Daula and Moffit (1995) is in contrast with this result and finds that, although the option value has a 
comparable in-sample predictive validity, it is not as able as the more complex models to predict out-of-
sample. 
15 The length of the period exploited in their estimation – 16 periods (years) instead of the 3 exploited by 
Stock and Wise (1990) and by Lumsdaine, Stock and Wise (1992b) – also represents a considerable 
improvement and requires remarkable computational capabilities. THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY AND PREDICTIVE VALIDITY | 13 
retirement and application to SSDI – according to the maximum between the expected utilities 
under the two alternatives.
16 
Although applications of the Stock and Wise’s model are numerous, most of them do not 
actually provide estimates of the utility functions parameters. Rather, the expected gain from 
postponing retirement is simply used as a regressor in reduced form models to explain the 
retirement probability. In other words, in the structural model the maximum likelihood method 
estimates a specific value function – defining its utility functions parameters – which better 
approximates observed behaviour. In the reduced form (probit-type) models instead, the 
retirement probability depends, among other variables, on the expected gain of postponing 
retirement computed exogenously assuming specific parameters of the utility functions.
17 
These reduced form applications of the option value model have multiplied in the literature, 
because their implementation is relatively easy and because their results are more easily 
readable and comparable across models. The most recent ones are collected in Gruber and Wise 
(2004), which present applications for twelve developed countries. For each country a probit 
model is estimated and, between the various specifications, there is one that includes the “option 
value” among the right-hand side variables.
18 A peculiar method is used in the German case 
(Börsch-Supan, Schnabel, Kohnz, and Mastrobuoni 2004), where the option value is partly 
estimated by grid search (in particular the parameter k) and partly exogenously assumed.
19 
Beyond those collected in this volume, other significant reduced form applications of the option 
value model are Samwick (1998) and Blundell, Meghir, and Smith (2002).
20 
An innovative application of the option value model is finally provided in Piekkola and Leijola 
(2004). They extend it to incorporate the value of unpaid household work (upkeep of the 
household and providing for its members). In the computations they assume risk neutrality (γ = 
1) and a relative value of leisure versus work (κ) equal to 1 (i.e. what they propose is a reduced 
form application of the option value model). The instantaneous utilities then become: 
                                                      
16 They also modify the functional forms of the utility functions, because they could not estimate all the 
parameters of the original version. Identification problems in estimating the option value model are also 
found in Harris (2001) and Spataro (2000b). 
17 A very simplified version of the option value model is the average cost of leaving (ACOL) model. It 
consists in a simple probit model where the probability to retire depends on the expected gain from 
postponing retirement, specified assuming  1 = = k γ . The ACOL model Warner (1979) is actually prior 
to the Stock and Wise’s model and was extensively used to study retention in the military personnel. 
According to Ausink and Wise(1993), the ACOL model was used frequently enough by the Air Force 
Personnel Analysis Center to have been incorporated in an interacted computer programme called the 
“Compensation Model” for determining the effects of various changes in compensation policies (see 
Norris 1987). 
18 Results show a strong relationship between levels of social security incentives and retirement behaviour 
in each country. Simulations show surprisingly uniform policy effects in countries characterised by very 
different labour markets, cultural and social characteristics. These results confirm and strengthen those 
found in the previous version of this volume (Gruber and Wise 1999). 
19 The estimates found in this paper were used for other policy simulations first in Berkel and Börsch-
Supan (2004) and later in Berkel and Börsch-Supan (2005). 
20 Using a rich dataset, with very detailed information on both pensions and social security benefits, the 
former study allowed for two strands of the retirement literature to be tied together. It in fact demonstrates 
that the impact of social security incentives on retirement can be shown to be either very high or very 
low, depending on whether pensions are kept in or left out of the analysis. The past studies (e.g. Hurd and 
Boskin 1981), which assume no impact of pensions on retirement and which show a limited impact of 
social security on it, could be thus reconciled with the more recent ones, which instead show a strong 
impact of pensions. The latter study is similar to the former but it is applied to the UK instead of the US. 14 | MICHELE BELLONI 
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where  D and Dret represent the domestic work when working and retired respectively. The 
economic value of one hour devoted to household work is measured with the wage rate of an 
household-help worker (or minimum wages). Computations are performed for a group of EU 
countries. The main result is that the inclusion of domestic work in incentive calculations makes 
retirement much more attractive (replacement rates become even greater than 100% in some 
cases), and the results correlate with the actual retirement ages in Europe. 
4. Conclusions 
The economic literature on retirement behaviour has progressed constantly since the early days. 
The first one-period leisure/consumption model, in which retirement was treated as a standard 
labour supply choice, made clear its peculiarities and called for an ad hoc framework of 
analysis. Gradually, models incorporated forward-looking behaviour and the life-cycle approach 
replaced the short-sighted one. Reduced form models were initially the only available analytical 
framework; OLS regressions, hazard models and other simplified techniques were the 
econometric tools. When the dynamic programming rule came onto the scene, the development 
of structural models was slowed down by its computational complexity. Strong simplifying 
assumptions on the error terms had to be imposed in order to make them tractable. 
The option value model was considered as a less complex rule than the dynamic programming 
one, and no worse at approximating actual behaviour. Afterwards, economic, econometrics and 
technological advances, together with the availability of longitudinal datasets, allowed for 
increasingly complex models. Modern specifications relax many simplifying assumptions and 
include modelling multiple simultaneous decisions and alternative exit routes. They explain 
much more than the first dynamic programming applications, to which the option value was 
compared. The most known example is given by the spikes of exit at ages 62 and 65 in the US, 
which had been a puzzle for a long time. Recently, several explanations of this puzzle have been 
tested and confirmed in structural models, ranging from heterogeneous subjective discount 
factors, to limited borrowing and to interactions between Social Security and Medicare 
institutions. 
A comparison between option value and more recent models however depends on the specific 
context of the analysis. Even if in many cases, as occurred for the US puzzle, it is likely that 
more complex models better approximate reality, there can be situations in which rules 
governing actual behaviour are simpler and suitable to be modelled within the option value 
framework. At the same time, the option value itself can to some extent be modified and 
adapted to given circumstances. 
Between the possible directions taken by the literature on retirement in the coming years, two 
seem particularly promising. The first is the development of analytical frameworks where 
supply and demand side aspects of retirement are jointly modelled. While the study of the 
demand has been so far limited by scarce information on labour inputs and outputs, the new 
availability of matched employer-employees datasets can favour the development of unified 
approaches. This can be potentially helpful in understanding much of the unexplained 
retirement behaviour. The second consists of modelling continuous transitions to retirement. 
Recent evidence highlights various patterns of exit from the labour force and frequent non-THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY AND PREDICTIVE VALIDITY | 15 
smooth transitions from full-time contracts to old-age pension. Assuming retirement as a zero-
one choice – or as an absorbing state – should therefore be reconsidered. 
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